This paper is concerned with a kind of non-zero sum differential game driven by mean-field backward stochastic differential equation (MF-BSDE) with asymmetric information, whose novel feature is that both the state equation and the cost functional are of mean-field type. A necessary condition and a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point of the above problem are established. As applications, a mean-field linear-quadratic (MF-LQ) problem and a financial problem are studied.
Introduction
Mean-field theory has been an active research field in recent years, which has attracted a lot of researchers to investigate this theory. Mean-field theory was independently proposed by Lasry and Lions [1] and Huang et al. [2] , respectively. Since then, research on related topics and their applications has become popular among scholars. For instance, Bensoussan et al. [3] investigated the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies of LQ mean-field games; Øksendal and Sulem [4] researched optimal control of predictive mean-field equation and applied the theoretical results to solve optimal portfolio and consumption rate problems; Wu and Liu [5] derived the maximum principle for meanfield zero-sum stochastic differential game with partial information and applied the results to study a portfolio game problem; Hafayed et al. [6] studied the mean-field stochastic control problem under partial information and derived a necessary condition and a sufficient condition for optimal control; Huang and Wang [7] investigated a partial information linear-quadratic-Gauss game of larger-population system and obtained the decentralized strategy and approximate Nash equilibrium by studying the related mean-field game. We emphasize that the systems introduced in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] are governed by forward stochastic differential equations (SDEs).
Nonlinear BSDE was introduced by Pardoux and Peng [8] . From then on, the theory of BSDE has made a rapid development due to its wide applications. Shen and Jiang [9] proved the existence and uniqueness of BSDE driven by time-changed Lévy noise, where the generator is monotonic and general growth with respect to variable y, and Mu and Wu [10] provided an existence result of a coupled Markovian BSDE system. Hamadène and Lepeltier [11] discussed a stochastic zero-sum differential game of BSDE and obtained the existence of saddle point under the bounded case and Isaacs' condition. Wang and Yu [12] established a necessary condition and a verification theorem for open-loop Nash equilibrium point of non-zero sum differential game of BSDE under partial information. Furthermore, Wang et al. [13] discussed asymmetric information LQ non-zero sum differential game of BSDE and gave the feedback Nash equilibrium points. See also Wang and Yu [14] , Li and Yu [15] for more information.
In 2009, Buckdahn et al. [16] firstly introduced a new kind of BSDE by investigating a special mean-field problem, which is called MF-BSDE. Then, Ma and Liu [17] studied a partial information optimal control of infinite horizon MF-BSDE with delay, and a necessary condition and a sufficient condition for optimal control were derived; Li et al. [18] solved an LQ control problem of MF-BSDE, and the optimal control was represented by two Riccati-type equations and a mean-field SDE. Besides, Wu and Liu [19] studied an optimal control problem for mean-field zero-sum stochastic differential game under partial information. Recently, Lin et al. [20] discussed an open-loop LQ leader-follower of meanfield stochastic differential game and solved the corresponding optimal control problems for the follower and the leader; Du and Wu [21] considered a new kind of Stackelberg differential game of MF-BSDE, and they obtained the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, which admits a state feedback representation. What is more, Zhang [22] investigated an optimal control problem for terminal constraint mean-field SDE under partial information, which was solved by the backward separation method with a decomposition technique. To our best knowledge, the mean-field backward stochastic differential game has important applications in economic and financial fields, and the corresponding result is quite lacking in literature, then we highly desire to study such a topic. Note that the system in [17, 18] only contains one control process, [19] discussed the zero-sum game for a forward system, and [20, 21] investigated game problems under full information. Due to this, Problem (MFBNZ) is distinguished from the above literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce some basic notations and formulate the asymmetric information non-zero sum differential game of MF-BSDE. In Sect. 3, we establish a necessary condition and a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point of Problem (MFBNZ). In Sect. 4, we investigate the well-posedness of initial coupled mean-field forward and backward stochastic differential equation (MF-FBSDE), which plays an important role in Sects. 5 and 6. In Sect. 5, we use the theoretical results to study an MF-LQ problem with asymmetric information and give an explicit form of Nash equilibrium point. In Sect. 6, we put a financial problem into the framework of Problem (MFBNZ) and obtain a feedback optimal investment strategy. In Sect. 7, we give some concluding remarks.
Notations and problem formulation
Throughout this paper, we denote by R k the k-dimensional Euclidean space, by R k×l the collection of k × l matrices, by A τ the transpose of A, by ·, · and | · | the inner product and the norm in Euclidean space, respectively. Let (Ω, F, F t , P) be a complete filtered probability space with a natural filtration {F t , t ≥ 0} generated by an
the space of all R n -valued, F T -measurable random variables such that E|ξ | 2 < +∞.
In this paper, we study a kind of asymmetric information non-zero sum differential game of MF-BSDE. We only consider the case of two players. Similarly, we can study the case of n players. Consider the MF-BSDE
where we adopt the notation
and v 2 (·) are the control processes of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. MF-BSDE (1) characters that the two players cooperate to reach a terminal goal ξ at T. Let U i (i = 1, 2) be a nonempty convex subset of R k i , and F i t ⊆ F t be a given sub-filtration which is the information available to Player i at time t ∈ [0, T]. Introduce the admissible control set 
(see Buckdahn et al. [16] ). Ensuring achievement of the goal ξ , the two players have their own benefits described by the cost functional
(i = 1, 2), where
are continuous, and l i satisfies
Hypothesis 2 l i and Φ i (i = 1, 2) are continuously differentiable with respect to (y, z,ȳ,z, v 1 , v 2 ) and y, respectively. Besides, there exists a constant C such that the partial derivatives l iy , l iz , l iȳ , l iz , l iv 1 , l iv 2 (i = 1, 2) are bounded by C(1 + |y| + |z| + |ȳ| + |z| + |v 1 | + |v 2 |).
subject to state equation (1) and cost functional (2) . We call the above problem a meanfield backward non-zero sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. If (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) satisfies (3), we call it a Nash equilibrium point of Problem (MFBNZ).
Maximum principle
In this section, we will give a necessary condition and a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point of Problem (MFBNZ). Define the Hamiltonian function
where
with H iy , H iȳ , H iz , and H iz being the partial derivatives of H i with respect to y,ȳ, z, andz, respectively.
The necessary condition
Assume that (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is a Nash equilibrium point of Problem (MFBNZ). For fixed u 1 (·), to minimize the aforementioned cost functional J 2 (u 1 (·), v 2 (·)), subject to state equation (1) over U 2 is a "non-Markovian" optimal control problem of MF-BSDE. Similarly, for the case corresponding to fixed u 2 (·). Using the method introduced in Peng [23] , we can analyze the differential game problem. Here we only present the main result for saving space. 
The sufficient condition
Now we weaken Hypothesis 2 to 
, where 
In addition, for any
What is more, assume that
Proof For any v 1 (·) ∈ U 1 , we consider
are the state trajectories corresponding to (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) and (v 1 (·), u 2 (·)), respectively. Let
Then we have
The integration A 1 is written as
Since Φ 1 (y) is convex on y,
Then,
Combining (5) with (6), we have
Since H 1 (t, y, z, Ey, Ez, v 1 , u 2 (t), p 1 (t)) is convex in (y, z,ȳ,z, v 1 ), then (7) becomes
Similarly, we have
Thus, we draw the desired conclusion.
Mean-field FBSDE
In this section, we study the existence and uniqueness of solution to an initial coupled MF-FBSDE, which will be used in the rest of this paper. Consider the MF-FBSDE
Let G be an m × n full-rank matrix and use the notations
and satisfies (8) .
Hypothesis 4 (1) A(t, λ,λ) is uniformly Lipschitz with respect to λ,λ, and for each
is uniformly Lipschitz with respect to x.
, where β 1 , β 2 , μ 2 are given non-negative constants with
Theorem 4.1 Assume that Hypothesis 4 holds. MF-FBSDE (8) admits a unique solution
Proof Similar to Yu and Ji [24] and Bensoussan et al. [25] , we can prove this result. We omit the details for saving space.
An MF-LQ problem
This section focuses on solving an LQ case of Problem (MFBNZ). Applying Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we obtain an explicit form of Nash equilibrium point by optimal filters and Riccati equations. For simplicity, here we only deal with the case of one-dimensional Brownian motion. Consider the linear MF-BSDE
and the cost functional
and v 2 (·) are the control processes;N i (·) (i = 1, 2) is deterministic, non-negative, and uniformly bounded function; M i (·), N i (·), and γ i0 (i = 1, 2) are deterministic, positive and uniformly bounded functions. Here, we require N i (·) and γ i0 (i = 1, 2) to be positive, which guarantees m i = 0 (i = 1, 2) and k 3 = 0 given by (13)- (14) and (42), respectively.
To what follows, we want to get an explicit form of Nash equilibrium point. Due to the fact that F i t available to Player i (i = 1, 2) is only an abstract sub-filtration of F t , it is impossible to obtain a feedback Nash equilibrium point in general. So we mainly study three special information structures as follows: (1)
t , i.e., Player 1 and Player 2 have the same observation information; (2)
t , i.e., Player 1 has more information than Player 2; (3)
t , i.e., Player 1 and Player 2 possess the mutually independent information.
According to Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is a Nash equilibrium point of the MF-LQ problem if and only if
For the sake of simplicity, here we omit the time variable t in (12) . Similar convention will be taken for the subsequent equations except for the initial or terminal conditions. In addition, we give Hypothesis 5 throughout Sect. 5. 
Hypothesis 5 B

Symmetric information:
In this case, we denote E[p 1 (t)|F
To derive an explicit form of Nash equilibrium point, we first introduce two sets of ordinary differential equations (ODEs): 
Since (13) and (14) are coupled with each other, it is difficult to prove their existence and uniqueness except for some special cases. For example, Hypothesis 6 C 2 (t) = -C 2 (t).
Lemma 5.1
Under Hypotheses 5-6, there exists a unique solution (λ 1 , m 1 , n 1 , λ 2 , m 2 , n 2 ) to (13) and (14) .
Proof Noticing (13) and (14), we introduce 
In what follows, we prove that (15) 
where m(·) is the solution to (16) . It is easy to see that (17) and (18) have unique solutions m 1 and m 2 , respectively. Besides, we check that m 1 and m 2 in (15) are the solutions to (17) and (18), respectively. According to the existence and uniqueness of solutions to (17) and (18), we have
which implies that (15) admits a unique solution (m 1 , m 2 ).
Similarly, we introduce Finally, we introduce
where λ i , m i (i = 1, 2) are the solutions to (20) and (15), respectively. Besides, similar to (20) and (15), we know that (22) is uniquely solvable. For simplicity, we let n = n 1 + n 2 .
Based on the arguments above, we get that (13) and (14) have unique solutions (λ 1 , m 1 , n 1 ) and (λ 2 , m 2 , n 2 ), respectively.
In the following, we will use five steps to give the explicit form of Nash equilibrium point.
Step 1: The unexplicit form of Nash equilibrium point. (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is the Nash equilibrium point of the MF-LQ problem if and only if it is uniquely determined by
where (y, z 1 , z 2 , p 1 , p 2 ) is the solution of
Noticing that since (23) 
2p 2 ) dt -ẑ 2 dW 2 , dp 1 = (Ap 1 +ĀEp 1 -N 1ŷ -N 1 Ey) dt + (C 2p1 +C 2 Ep 1 ) dW 2 , dp 2 = (Ap 2 +ĀEp 2 -N 2ŷ -N 2 Ey) dt + (C 2p2 +C 2 Ep 2 ) dW 2 , y(T) =ξ ,p 1 (0) = -γ 10ŷ (0),p 2 (0) = -γ 20ŷ (0). (24) Note that this filtering equation is different from the case introduced in Chap. 2 of Wang et al. [27] , whose existence and uniqueness need to be proved below.
Step 3: Existence and uniqueness of (24) . Introduce a new MF-FBSDE 
With the help of Hypothesis 5, it is easy to check that Hypothesis 4 holds. Then Theorem 4.1 implies that (25) is uniquely solvable. Now we intend to prove that the existence and uniqueness of (25) are equivalent to those of (24) . On the one hand, we prove that the solution of (24) is the solution of (25) . In fact, the conclusion is easily drawn with the assumption
On the other hand, we prove that the solution of (25) is the solution of (24) . Let (Y , Z 2 , P) be a solution of (25) , and set
It follows from the existence and uniqueness of mean-field stochastic differential equation
In order to say (Y , Z 2 ,p i ) (i = 1, 2) is a solution of (24), we only check Fixing Y , we derive P =P, and then (27) holds indeed. Hence, the existence and uniqueness of (25) are equivalent to those of (24) .
Step 4: Existence and uniqueness of (23) . Fixingp 1 andp 2 in (23), we can easily prove that (23) admits a unique solution (y, z 1 , z 2 , p 1 , p 2 ).
Step 5: The feedback Nash equilibrium point. According to the first equation of (23) together with the terminal condition in (23), we set
Applying Itô's formula to p 1 in (28), we have
Putting (28) into the second equation of (23), and comparing the coefficients of (29) and (23), we get
Taking E[·|F
t ] on both sides of (28) and (30), we havê
Here we assume m 1 = 0. Substituting (30) into (31) and taking E[·|F
t ] on both sides of (31), it becomes
From (34), we derive (13) . Similarly, (14) is derived by applying Itô's formula to p 2 .
To close this subsection, we give the explicit form ofŷ(t). Putting (30) into the first equation of (23) + q 1 (t)Ey(t) = -q 2 (t),
with
where m, λ and n = n 1 + n 2 are represented by (16) , (21), and (22) 
Set
Then the first equation of (24) is written as
whose unique solution iŝ
Theorem 5.1 Under Hypotheses 5-6, the feedback Nash equilibrium point (u 1 (t), u 2 (t)) of the MF-LQ problem is uniquely denoted by
where λ i , m i , n i (i = 1, 2), Ey andŷ are given by (13) , (14), (37), and (40), respectively.
Asymmetric information
Here we solve two asymmetric information structures introduced above. The corresponding derivation procedures are similar to those of Sect. 5.1, so we omit the nonessential details and only give the main results. 5-6 hold. Then the feedback Nash equilibrium point (u 1 (t), u 2 (t)) of the MF-LQ problem is uniquely determined by
F
1 t = F t and F 2 t = F W 2 t In this case, E[p 1 (t)|F 1 t ] = E[p 1 (t)|F t ] = p 1 (t), E[p 1 (t)|F 2 t ] = E[p 1 (t)|F W 2 t ] =p 2 (t).
Theorem 5.2 Let Hypotheses
where λ 2 , m 2 , n 2 , Ey, andŷ are the unique solutions to (14) , (37), and (40), respectively; k i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) and y satisfy
and
with q 1 , q 2 , q 3 are represented by (36) and (38), respectively, and
respectively.
Feedback Nash equilibrium point (41) shows that although Player 1 observes full information, the control strategy of Player 1 is heavily influenced by the information available to Player 2 via Ey andŷ. This is an interesting phenomenon.
F
Hypothesis 7 guarantees that the filtering equation of (12) 
Theorem 5.3 Assume that Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 7 hold. Then the MF-LQ problem
has a unique Nash equilibrium point (u 1 (t), u 2 (t)) represented by 
respectively.
Application in a financial problem
In this section, we consider an investment problem in a financial market. With the help of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, an explicit form of optimal investment strategy is obtained.
We begin with a typical setup for the financial market, in which a bond and two stocks are continuously traded, and their prices satisfy
where r(·) is called the interest rate of the bond; μ i (·), σ i (·) (i = 1, 2) are called the appreciation rate of return and volatility coefficient of the ith stock.
Hypothesis 8
The market coefficients r(·), μ i (·), σ i (·) (i = 1, 2) are deterministic and bounded processes. What is more, σ
Suppose that there are two investors cooperating to invest a bond and two stocks, whose decision cannot influence the prices in the financial market. Furthermore, we assume that Investor 1 only cares about the price of the first stock, i.e., F
however, Investor 2 cares about the prices of these two stocks, i.e., F
Assume that these two investors want to obtain a terminal wealth ξ at T, which is an F T -measurable, non-negative, and square-integrable random variable. Meanwhile, both of them hope to minimize their own risks, described by J i (i = 1, 2). In detail, we denote by π i (·) the amount that the investors invest in the ith (i = 1, 2) stock and by y(·) the wealth of the two investors. Then, y(·) is modeled by
where , 2) ; v 1 (·) and v 2 (·) are certain economic factors, which can be interpreted as capital injection or withdrawal.
Define the associated performance functional for each investor as follows:
(i = 1, 2), where BM i (·) is a deterministic benchmark; Φ i (i = 1, 2) is a positive constant.
In the performance functional, the first term measures the variance of the wealth y(·); the second term measures the difference between the economic factor v i (·) and benchmark BM i (·) (i = 1, 2) decided by the two investors; the last term in the performance functional characterizes the initial wealth y(·) at time 0. Let U be a nonempty and convex subset of R. Define the admissible control set
Then the investment problem is stated as follows.
Problem (F)
Find a pair of (u 1 ,
subject to (43) and (44). If such a pair of (u 1 , u 2 ) exists, we call it an optimal investment strategy of Problem (F).
Clearly, Problem (F) can be regarded as a non-zero sum mean-field backward stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, which is a special case of Problem (MFBNZ).
Here, we point out that Problem (F) is different from the MF-LQ problem, due to two distinguishing features below: firstly, the generator of the first equation of (47) has an additional term b 2ž2 , which leads to a difficulty of proving the existence and uniqueness of solution to it; secondly, (44) contains the first terms of y(·) and v i (·), and then Theorem 5.2 cannot be used to solve Problem (F).
We firstly study a special case that
t , which plays an important role in solving the asymmetric information case.
Symmetric information:
In the following, we use four steps to solve this case.
Step 1: Optimal investment strategy. The optimal investment strategy (u 1 , u 2 ) of Problem (F) has the form of
where (y, z 1 , z 2 , p 1 , p 2 ) satisfies
t ] on both sides of each equation of (46) yields
Step 2: Existence and uniqueness of (50).
Similar to Lemma 5.1, we can prove that (48) and (49) are uniquely solvable. What is more, it follows from Φ 1 > 0 that the solution γ 1 (·) < 0. For convenience, let γ = γ 1 +γ 2 , η = η 1 +η 2 .
Introduce an auxiliary MF-FBSDE
which is subject to an additional hypothesis as follows.
According to Hypothesis 4, (50) has a unique solution (y,ž 1 ,p 1 ,p 2 ).
Step 3: The equivalence between (47) and (50) with (45). We first prove that the solution (y,ž 1 ,p 1 ,p 2 ) of (50) 
Applying Itô's formula to p 1 in (51), we get dp 1 = (γ 1 + rγ 1 )y + γ 1 (b 1 z 1 + b 2 z 2 ) -γ 1 (γ 1 + γ 2 )y +η 1
Comparing (52) with the second equation of (46), we have 
Putting (53) into (54) subject to (51), and taking E[·] on both sides of (54), we arrive at 
It is easy to check that the optimal filter (y,ž 1 ,ž 2 ,p 1 ,p 2 ) of (y, z 1 , z 2 , p 1 , p 2 ) in (62) still satisfies (47), and theny andp 1 are represented by (60) and (56), respectively.
Step 2: Existence and uniqueness of (63). 
It follows from Theorem 4.1 that (63) is uniquely solvable.
Step 3: The explicit form of optimal investment strategy. In order to obtain the feedback optimal investment strategy, we have to establish the relationship between p 2 and y,y. Noticing the first equation of (63) together with the terminal condition in (63), we set p 2 = δ 1 y + δ 2y + δ 3 , δ 1 (0) = -Φ 2 , δ 2 (0) = δ 3 (0) = 0.
Applying Itô's formula to p 2 in (64), we have dp 2 = δ 1 + rδ 1 -δ [12, 14] , and [28] .
The results in Sects. 5-6 are based on special information structures, which are generated by Brown motion or its components. The case that the information structures are general is not considered. We hope to return to it in a future work. Besides, we assume that all coefficients of the MF-LQ problem and Problem (F) are deterministic. Otherwise, there is an immediate difficulty to solve the problems with stochastic coefficients. We will come back to the problems in the future.
